More Shopping OptionsThis important contribution to the debate over the efficacy of economic sanctions develops a rational theory of why leaders choose sanctions, rather than another foreign policy tool, what type, whether to sustain them, and when to terminate them. This book breaks new ground with its innovative argument and thorough testing using a variety of data bases.
A. Cooper Drury is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri.
“With surprising results that often come from actually testing a set of both theoretically derived and “conventional wisdom” propositions, Professor Drury’s rigorous analysis sets a new, higher standard in the study of economic coercion. Definitively laying to rest some questions, refining others, and posing new ones, Professor Drury’s findings will serve as the platform for the next generation of research on why, when, and how the U.S. government employs economic sanctions to achieve its goals in foreign policy as well as foreign economic policy—an important distinction it turns out. Given the renaissance of interest in alternatives to military force, this book is not only important but also timely.”
--Richard S. Olson, Professor of Political Science, Florida International University
"Cooper Drury has managed to unearth new ways of thinking about sanctions, contributing to a wide-ranging and important debate. By focusing on the understudied area of presidential decision-making on sanctions, he increases understanding of why they continue to be so frequently used in the face of conventional wisdom that they 'never work.'"
--Kimberly Elliott, co-author of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Introduction * Economic Coercion in Theory and Practice * Evaluating Sanction Effectiveness * Why Does the President Sanction? Beyond the Conventional Wisdom * When Does the President Sanction? An Empirical Analysis * Is There a Target Selection Bias? * The Decision to Modify an Economic Sanction Policy * What Kinds of Sanctions Does the President Use? Domestic Constraints and Incentives * Conclusions and Implications
